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Crowdwork Platform Governance toward Organizational Value Creation  
 
Abstract  
Crowdwork, a new form of digitally mediated employment and part of the so-called gig economy, has 
the capacity to change the nature of work organization and to provide strategic value to workers, job 
providers, and intermediary platform owners. However, because crowdwork is temporary, large-scale, 
distributed, and mediated, its governance remains a challenge that often casts a shadow over its strategic 
value. The objective of this paper is to shed light on the making of value-adding crowdwork 
arrangements. Specifically, the paper explores crowdwork platform governance mechanisms and the 
relationships between these mechanisms and organizational value creation. Building on a 
comprehensive review of the extant literature on governance and crowdwork, we construct an 
overarching conceptual model that integrates control system and coordination system as two 
complementary mechanisms that drive crowdwork platform governance effectiveness and the 
consequent job provider benefits. Furthermore, the model accentuates the role of the degree of 
centralization and the degree of routinization as critical moderators in crowdwork platform governance. 
Overall, the paper highlights the potential of crowdwork to contribute not only to inclusion, fair wages 
and flexible work arrangements for workers but also to organizations’ value and competitive edge. 
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Paid, online crowdwork1 has emerged as a new model of digitally mediated employment. It 
encompasses all kinds of remunerated work organized via online labor platforms, which function as 
online marketplaces that enable job providers to look for workers and help job seekers to find work 
(Kittur et al., 2013). This paper sheds light on the mechanics of crowdwork platforms and theorizes on 
the relationship between crowdwork platform governance and organizational value.  
Crowdwork is expected to contribute to innovation, strategic competitive advantage, and 
reduction of labor costs by giving organizations flexible access to a large pool of resourceful and (usually 
cheap) labor on a temporary basis. Platforms such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) and Upwork 
play an essential role in crowdwork arrangements, facilitating the transactions and interactions between 
workers and job providers. For workers across the globe, crowdwork has the potential to unlock 
previously unthinkable career opportunities in online marketplaces (Marr, 2016). However, crowdwork 
can be a double-edged sword, as it can both enhance and diminish the quality of workers’ lives (Deng 
et al., 2016). Furthermore, in terms of strategic value for job providers, the low cost of labor, with limited 
or no worker protections, may provide short-term benefits but may not be sustainable in the long term 
(Kittur et al., 2013). Nevertheless, crowdwork is disrupting the working arrangements that already 
endure major shifts in contemporary business organizations (Forman et al., 2014).  
There are three key stakeholders in crowdwork: workers, organizations or individuals providing 
work (job providers or employers2) and intermediary platforms (online marketplaces). Getting value out 
of crowdwork is challenging for all three stakeholders for various reasons. Workers’ high dropout rates 
 
1 Crowdwork and crowdsourcing are often used interchangeably in the literature. We use the term crowdwork 
because we focus exclusively on paid labor, whereas crowdsourcing often relies on volunteers (e.g., in 
emergencies) (Liu, 2014). Moreover, in this paper, crowdwork only refers to work performed by workers 
external to the job provider’s organization. 
2 Crowdworkers are self-proprietors (i.e., they are not employees in a legal sense). However, crowdworkers 
often still act like parties to an employment contract (Chen and Horton, 2016).  
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due to low wages or unfair treatment, which have been studied extensively (Deng et al., 2016; Ma et al., 
2016), threaten the long-term viability of the crowdwork industry. From a legal perspective, major 
problems lie in categorizing the relationships between the job provider, platform and worker (Donini et 
al., 2017). From an organizational point of view, crowdwork comprises the changing of permanent jobs 
into a supple resource pool in which crowdworkers assume tasks in a project-based manner (Durward 
et al., 2016). There is a risk of losing knowledge and control over the crowd’s activities, not just because 
the work is distributed and temporary, but also because of the intermediary platforms. Many of these 
challenges can be traced to how crowdwork platforms operate – temporary work arrangements, scalable 
and distributed workforce, and technology-mediated activities – which make crowdwork platform 
governance difficult. Platform governance consists of two aspects: governance of and governance by 
platforms (Gillespie, 2017). The first aspect refers to the rules that platforms need as an intermediary, 
while the second aspect refers to the platforms’ ability to mediate between sides, moderate content, 
coordinate and control the workflow (Gillespie, 2017). This paper focuses on the latter, and thus we use 
the term crowdwork platform governance throughout the rest of this paper to denote the responsibility 
of platforms as mediators of temporary and distributed work arrangements between job providers and 
workers.  
 Governance is often mentioned in studies of crowdwork but remains poorly defined. In broad 
terms, crowdwork platform governance refers to various control and coordination systems, including 
work practices, standards and policies (Deng et al., 2016, p. 281) with regard to, for example, task 
design, feedback from clients or platforms, financial and/or social incentives, and quality management 
(Schörpf et al., 2017, p. 46). However, a review of the literature reveals a dearth of systematic studies 
of crowdwork platform governance mechanisms. Furthermore, the crowdwork phenomenon is in the 
infancy stage, with related practices still forming and socio-technical processes remaining flexible 
(Nickerson, 2014). Consequently, Information Systems (IS) scholars have an opportunity to contribute 
to understanding and designing the social and technical foundations of crowdwork.  
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Accordingly, this paper aims, first, to contribute to a better understanding of crowdwork 
platform governance and, subsequently, to address some of the most pressing challenges that job 
provider organizations face in attempting to extract value from crowdwork. Particularly, while extant 
research differentiates between creative and routine crowdwork (Buettner, 2015; Margaryan, 2016), it 
is unclear whether and how routine and creative crowdwork are governed differently by platforms and 
how this may impact the value generation to job providers. Similarly, while research increasingly 
recognizes that governance by crowdwork platforms may be done in either a centralized or a 
decentralized manner (Atzori, 2015; Hein et al., 2016), it is unclear how different governance 
mechanisms function under centralized and decentralized crowdwork platform governance modes. 
Thus, for organizations making the decision to use crowdwork as part of their employment strategy, 
knowledge and choices regarding crowdwork platform governance are critical (Nickerson et al., 2017).  
With this in mind, in the present review paper, we focus on understanding, revealing, and 
synthesizing the key constructs at play in the literature and theoretically reflecting on governance issues 
in crowdwork platforms by addressing the following research question: What is the relationship between 
crowdwork platform governance mechanisms and organizational value creation? To answer this overall 
question, we must also clarify what the crowdwork platform governance mechanisms are. We analyze 
the crowdwork literature to elicit how governance has been investigated and conceptualized. The paper 
focuses on crowdwork systems from the job provider’s perspective, examining the opportunities and 
challenges for organizational value creation. We contribute to the domain of crowdwork by introducing 
a conceptual model of crowdwork platform governance that is also suitable for alternative, decentralized 
crowdwork arrangements and for both routine and creative crowdwork platforms. Practically, the 
suggested model provides a basis to specifying guidelines for crowdwork, enabling organizations to take 
advantage of the potentials of crowdwork while also establishing fair working conditions for individual 
crowdworkers (Durward et al., 2016).  
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2. Theoretical Foundations  
 This section lays the groundwork for the examination of crowdwork platform governance. It 
introduces crowdwork platforms as a specific case of multi-sided platforms and covers the conceptual 
foundations for the study of crowdwork platform governance.  
2.1 Multi-sided Platforms 
Crowdwork platforms may be considered an instance of multi-sided platforms (Schmidt, 2017), 
functioning as online markets that facilitate exchange among various types of stakeholders who are not 
otherwise able to transact with each other (Gawer, 2014). For example, Airbnb and eBay enable 
interactions between two or more separate sides through the platform (Hagiu and Wright, 2015).  
Upwork provides independent workers from around the world the ability to connect with and offer their 
services (e.g., programming skills) to job providers. The exchanges facilitated by the platform are 
usually one-off transactions. 
Overall, the platform plays an intermediary role to coordinate the supply and demand aspects 
of a market (Schmidt, 2017). The platforms tend to move most of the expenses, risks and responsibilities 
to the other parties, and they usually only provide a virtual service such as an app or a website and do 
not support the labor cost or the production means (Schmidt, 2017). At the same time, the platforms 
uphold sole and privileged control over data, processes and rules on the platform. The services and tasks 
are coordinated via the platform but are not necessarily bound to a precise place and specific person. 
Thus, these kinds of platforms are often location-independent and support distributed actions as well as 
a high degree of scalability. These characteristics of multi-sided platforms – mediation between 
distributed sides, temporary arrangements, and scalability – are mirrored in the characteristics of 




Crowdwork includes all types of paid work organized via online labor platforms (De Stefano, 
2016; Donini et al., 2017). These platforms function as intermediaries between workers and job 
providers, facilitating the description, submission, acceptance and payment for the work accomplished 
(Irani, 2015a). AMT, Upwork, TopCoder, CrowdFlower, and Clickworker are some examples of 
crowdwork platforms (Margaryan, 2016).  
The nature of tasks on crowdwork platforms can differ noticeably. Research distinguishes 
between microwork (i.e., more routine crowdwork) and online freelancing (i.e., more creative 
crowdwork) (De Stefano, 2016; Margaryan, 2016).3 Microwork includes projects divided into 
microtasks that can be performed in seconds or minutes, are generally repetitive, and do not require a 
high level of skill (e.g., filling out surveys, tagging pictures) (De Stefano, 2016). Microtasks are defined 
as “stand-alone tasks” with a “clear definition” (Buettner, 2015, p. 4611). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) is the best-known example of a microwork or routine crowdwork platform.  
In contrast, creativity fundamentally involves innovative performance (Woodman et al. 1993). 
Creative tasks include idea creation, competition, and evaluation that can be accomplished by the crowd 
(Buettner, 2015). As such, creative work often requires significantly more resources (e.g., skills and 
time) than routine work at individual, team, and organizational levels (Rimmer, 2016). Online 
freelancing is a good example of more creative crowdwork. In this case, job providers contract skilled 
services, such as graphic design and web development, to dispersed workers (Margaryan, 2016). 
 
3 The degree of routinization and the degree of creativity of work are two anchors on a continuum that 
characterize the complexity of work tasks and the consequent skill level required to accomplish it. However, in 
this paper, we make a dichotomous distinction between routine and creative crowdwork to coincide with the 
noticeable difference between the crowdwork platforms that focus on routine microtasks (e.g., AMT) and the 
platforms that focus on creative freelancing (e.g., TopCoder). Thus, we presume that routine crowdwork implies 
non-creative work, and similarly, that creative crowdwork implies non-routine work.  
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Upwork (previously oDesk and Elance) is an example of an online freelancing or creative crowdwork 
platform (Margaryan, 2016). 
Crowdwork platforms provide a governance structure that is necessary to address the challenges 
in managing a distributed and scalable workforce (Deng et al., 2016; Greengard, 2011) performing tasks 
that have traditionally been handled by small, dedicated groups in organizations (e.g., Deng et al., 2016; 
Kittur et al. 2013). Crowdwork platforms govern the work process (e.g., instruction, configuration, task 
assignment) to drive participation of workers and improve worker productivity (Deng et al., 2016). Both 
unclear task descriptions and complex interfaces can impact the quality of work negatively, because 
workers are uncertain of the correct procedures and expectations (Kittur et al., 2013). As task complexity 
increases, the governance of the work process can be expected to become more challenging.  
In sum, the factors that impact crowdwork success and the value generated for job providers are 
both platform- and work-related and are often difficult to separate. As online, paid crowdwork only 
exists and functions because it is performed via a platform, we contend that crowdwork governance is 
crowdwork platform governance. Specifically, it is the governance by platforms of temporary, scalable, 
distributed and mediated work arrangements between job providers and workers – as will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
2.3 Crowdwork Platform Governance 
It is necessary for multi-sided platforms to attract, coordinate and control the respective parties 
participating in the platform (Schreieck et al., 2016). Crowdwork platforms, specifically, have been 
argued to provide general directive control through the standards, policies and rules that guide behavior 
on the platform (Deng et al., 2016; Manner et al., 2012) and allow the monitoring of workers’ and job 
providers’ performance and environment (Howcroft and Bergvall-Kåreborn, 2018). Furthermore, 
crowdwork platforms coordinate the interactions among job providers and workers (Howcroft and 
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Bergvall-Kåreborn, 2018; Schmidt, 2017). Thus, crowdwork platform governance rests on two key 
aspects: control and coordination.  
In multi-sided platforms, control includes the ways that the platform owner monitors and 
oversees the processes inside the platform (Schmidt, 2017). Having access to data on all interactions 
enables platform owners to have the power to affect the exchange among the parties (Schreieck et al., 
2016). The well-known control strategies of formal and informal control (Eisenhardt, 1985) are utilized 
in crowdwork platforms through mechanisms such as quality control and reputation control (Schreieck 
et al., 2016). Formal control is performed via performance evaluation (Eisenhardt, 1985), with behavior 
and outcome evaluation being the two common modes of formal control. In behavior control, controllers 
monitor controlees’ behaviors and reward them according to the degree to which they follow the 
procedures (Kirsch, 1997). In outcome control, controllers evaluate performance and grant rewards in 
relation to outcomes achieved, not procedures followed (Eisenhardt, 1985). Informal control, 
conversely, can be reached by minimizing the divergence of preferences between organizational 
members (Eisenhardt, 1985). In this case, members collaborate in the accomplishment of organizational 
goals because they have internalized these goals. Internalization of goals may be achieved through a 
variety of informal control mechanisms such as affirmative human resource policies, training, team 
building, and socialization (Kirsch, 1997).  
Coordination in crowdwork platforms includes mechanisms for attracting both job providers 
and workers (cf. Hagiu and Spulber, 2013) through managing dependencies between crowdwork 
activities (based on Crowston, 1997; Malone and Crowston, 1994; Kittur et al., 2013). While 
coordination refers to “the act of working together harmoniously” (Malone and Crowston, 1990, p. 5), 
in classic organizational research, coordination and control are often entangled and are not always easy 
to distinguish. For example, Mintzberg (1980) discusses five ways to facilitate coordination; however, 
some of these (direct supervision, outputs standardization and work process standardization) overlap 
with formal control mechanisms, while others (skills standardization) overlap with informal control 
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mechanisms. Only one – mutual adjustment, in which workers coordinate their activities via informal 
communication with each other (Mintzberg, 1980) – truly functions as a coordination method. 
Coordination methods are selected to manage dependencies among tasks and resources that exist in the 
process (Crowston, 1997). For example, in crowdwork platforms, complex jobs require task 
decomposition into subtasks, where two or more workers may be working on the same task or 
consecutive tasks, setting limitations on their actions and demands on their interactions with each other 
(cf. Kittur et al., 2013). To solve these coordination problems, platforms must engage in additional 
activities not captured in formal and informal controls.  
In the next section, we introduce the distinction between centralized and decentralized 
governance – a theoretically and practically significant factor to consider in crowdwork platform 
governance given the increased attention in the discourse to distributed architectures, such as peer-to-
peer networks and blockchain technology, which rapidly gain traction across industries and provide an 
infrastructure for a new form of decentralized crowdwork platforms (Tate et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2016).   
2.3.1 Centralized and Decentralized Crowdwork Platform Governance  
The overwhelming majority of research on crowdwork and its governance assumes that 
crowdwork arrangements are, by design, limited to configurations of workers, employers and centralized 
intermediary platforms, such as AMT (Vakharia and Lease, 2015). However, recent research has 
highlighted that crowdwork as a concept could go beyond traditional centralized arrangements by 
drawing on ideas of cooperativism and worker-owned and -managed platforms (Gaikwad et al., 2015; 
Scholz, 2016).  
Centralized and decentralized modes of crowdwork platform governance are likely to apply 
different control and coordination mechanisms in the platform, which subsequently may have different 
advantages and disadvantages (Hein et al., 2016). Centralized crowdwork platform governance is 
expected to enable smooth coordination of workflows on highly separate tasks through central guidance 
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and direction (based on King, 19834). There is a high level of control over work process and output 
standards (Brown and Grant, 2005), which enables control over work quality and crowdworker behavior 
through monitoring and assessment against standards (based on King, 1983). Centralized crowdwork 
platform governance is known to effectively keep performance in line with platform protocols and 
procedures (King, 1983). Thus, centralization has clear advantages. 
However, centralization also has adverse side effects that stem from power concentration, such 
as dishonesty, discrimination, protection of status and misuse of power (Zyskind et al., 2015). In 
crowdwork platforms, a centralized governance means a lack of direct communication among workers 
and job providers, because all communications are mediated via the platform (Kittur et al., 2013). Thus, 
mutual adjustment among workers is hindered. Moreover, centralization of all decision-making (Brown 
and Grant, 2005) may lead to inefficiencies due to a lack of capacity and flexibility, which, in turn, may 
lead to insufficient responsiveness to challenges (Atzori, 2015). The high level of control exerted on 
participants during interactions and on the accessibility of workers to the platform also means there is 
often little transparency in governance processes (Hein et al., 2016).  
In comparison, decentralization of governance removes hierarchical power structures in 
organizations and, therefore, can decrease the misuse of power (Azfar et al., 2001; Zyskind et al., 2015). 
Decentralized crowdwork platform governance can improve efficiency by removing decision-making 
bottlenecks; can improve fairness, democracy, self-determination, and accountability by distributing 
decision-making rights and responsibilities; and can increase participation, ownership and obligation by 
all participants (based on Azfar et al., 2001; Brown and Grant, 2005). When work is more complex, 
decentralized crowdwork platform governance is likely to allow for smoother coordination of 
workflows, as overlapping tasks and parallel working requires cooperation among workers, worker 
 
4 King (1983) discusses the organizational considerations of centralized and decentralized computing in general, 
not specifically as applied to crowdwork platform governance. We have adapted his arguments to the context of 
crowdwork platform governance.  
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discretion and less central oversight (King, 1983). Moreover, decentralized arbitration systems within 
the platform can address conflicts via smart contracts, with rules agreed upon by the parties and matched 
with common law (Atzori, 2015). Furthermore, decentralized crowdwork platform governance provides 
an opportunity for direct communication among workers and between workers and job providers (based 
on Atzori, 2015).  
At the same time, decentralization can, paradoxically, remove behaviors and institutions that 
are vital to high-quality work (Whiting et al., 2016). Decentralization poses serious control and 
coordination challenges and creates demands for laborious consensus-based decision making. In 
decentralized governance, each platform stakeholder may potentially require different sets of controls 
and standards (Brown and Grant, 2005). Decentralized crowdwork platform governance can be 
expensive, because it requires creating and maintaining means to cater for the various parties’ opinions. 
Thus, there are substantial costs involved in applying well-developed decentralized plans (King, 1983). 
Incentives must be considered for managers, data processing experts, and members to pursue the 
creation of such a plan. As such incentives are not always readily available, a gradual development 
toward the decentralization of crowdwork platform governance may be appropriate (King, 1983). A 
summary of the differences between centralized and decentralized platform governance is presented in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Centralized Crowdwork Platform Governance vs. Decentralized Crowdwork Platform Governance 
 Centralized Crowdwork Platform (CP) 
Governance 




Central guidance and direction provide 
smoother coordination of workflow in 
discrete tasks (King, 1983). 
Worker discretion and distributed oversight 
provide smoother coordination of workflow in 
complex projects, where tasks overlap and 
parallel working and cooperation among 




There is no direct communication between 
workers and job providers (all 
communication is mediated by the central 
platform) (Kittur et al., 2013). 
There is an opportunity for direct 
communication among all platform participants 
(e.g., workers, job providers) (Atzori, 2015). 
Decision Making Decision making power is concentrated in 
the platform. The platform exercises a high 
level of control on whether and how workers 
and job providers can access the platform, 
and there is a lack of transparency in 
governance processes (Hein et al., 2016). 
Decision making power is distributed among all 
stakeholders. The platform’s control on workers 
and job providers is loosened, and the 
governance process is more transparent (Atzori, 
2015; Hein et al., 2016; Zyskind et al., 2015). 
Standardization 
 
The same set of standards guide all 
stakeholders’ behaviors on the platform 
(Brown and Grant, 2005). 
Different customized standards may guide the 
behavior of different stakeholders (Brown and 
Grant, 2005). 
Control Cost Cost of control is reduced, as the same rules 
are applied to all parties (Bergvall-Kåreborn 
and Howcroft, 2014; King, 1983). 
Cost of control is high, either because of efforts 
required to carry out control of various 
stakeholders with different interests and power 
or errors that happen due to no control (King, 
1983). 
Quality Control The platform controls workers’ submission 
adherence to platform standards through 
monitoring (King, 1983, p. 20).  
Consensus-based evaluation of quality controls 
workers’ submission adherence to collectively 
agreed-upon standards. Incentives for different 




Algorithms keep performance in line with the 
platform’s protocols and standards (King, 
1983). 
Workers’ discretion, self-regulation and 
informal control keep performance in line with 
the prevailing standards (King, 1983, p. 3). 
 
This concludes the groundwork for the literature review and conceptual model development. 
Above, we have clarified our approach to crowdwork platform governance. First, we considered 
crowdwork platforms as a specific case of multi-sided platforms. Second, we considered crowdwork 
platform governance as a matter of control and coordination of platform resources and activities. These 
conceptual clarifications guided the literature review, as outlined below.  
 
3. Methodology  
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Research on crowdwork is growing, and much of it has been conducted outside the Information 
Systems (IS) field. Due to the vastness of the crowdwork literature, we limited the initial sample of 
studies in the literature review to those in which both crowdwork platform and governance were central 
themes. Overall, we conducted a state-of-the-art theory development review that aimed to examine how 
crowdwork platform governance is conceptualized and practiced, as well as to explore potential 
theoretical extensions thereof. Accordingly, we used a theoretical review strategy (Paré et al., 2015) to 
analyze the literature in our search for themes and patterns with respect to crowdwork platform 
governance.  
The review covers conceptual and empirical papers in journals and conferences, both within and 
outside the IS field, that reveal a diversity of patterns concerning how crowdwork platform governance 
is conceptualized and studied, as summarized in Appendix (Table A.1, A.2 and A.3). We used the data 
in the Appendix as the basis for a subsequent analysis to identify themes in crowdwork platform 
governance research as well as to reveal perceived gaps and directions for future research. Broadly, we 
followed the approach of Webster and Watson (2002) to develop literature-based concept matrices that 
render the thematic terrain. Next, we followed the approach of Rowe (2014) to develop a conceptual 
model that portrays the relationships among concepts. 
 
3.1 Literature Search  
 In order to identify relevant literature for this study, we applied the recommendations of 
Webster and Watson (2002) and Rowe (2014). We used a comprehensive collection of scientific 
databases as the primary data source: EBSCO, Proquest, ACM DL, Scopus, Google Scholar, AISeL and 
IEEE Xplore. We searched for titles, keywords, abstracts, and full texts using the following 
combinations of search terms: (“crowdwork” OR “crowdsource” OR “crowdworker”) AND 
“governance”; (“job provider” OR “job requester”) AND “governance”; (“digital labor” OR “digital 
labor platform” OR “online digital market*” OR “Amazon Mechanical Turk”) AND “governance”. This 
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procedure ensured that the initial sample of studies included only those articles in which both crowdwork 
and governance were important themes. We included AMT (with spelling variations) as a specific 
crowdwork platform, because this platform is the most frequently studied. Aiming for high-quality 
publications, we began by focusing on papers from the AIS Senior Scholars’ Basket5 and designated IS 
conferences. We then extended the search scope to adjoining disciplines, such as computer science, 
social sciences, economics and finance, and law, as well as IEEE and ACM conferences. Within those 
disciplines, we eliminated publications not considered research papers, such as editorials, interviews, 
commentaries, book reviews and keynotes.  
Next, we selected a set of relevant research papers by going through each paper’s abstract and 
skimming the entire content. We considered only papers on paid crowdsourcing and paid crowdwork, 
while we excluded papers on unpaid crowdsourcing. Moreover, we only kept papers that explicated 
crowdwork platform governance in some detail, excluding papers that only mentioned the term 
“governance” but did not examine the phenomenon. Because the worker perspective heavily dominates 
the crowdwork literature, we made a choice to only focus on highly cited or review papers from the 
worker perspective. For example, there are many papers on the motivations of crowdworkers as well as 
on their legal status; of these, we selected only a few that (a) represented the majority of arguments made 
or (b) made alternative, but theoretically interesting arguments.  
 Finally, when a number of relevant papers had been identified, we utilized a snowballing 
approach to make sure we had not missed an essential source (Wohlin, 2014). This approach resulted in 




5  See https://aisnet.org/?SeniorScholarBasket. 
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3.2 Analysis  
Based on the review of the relevant literature, we first generated a classification of previous 
studies based on their overall focus and perspective on crowdworkers, job providers and the platform 
(Table A.1 in the appendix provides example papers, with further references provided in Table A.4). 
Most papers on crowdwork platform governance focus on the worker perspective (Nickerson, 2014), 
with less emphasis on the perspectives of the job provider and the platform. However, many papers 
discuss crowdwork from more than one agent’s perspective, typically focusing on either the worker and 
the job provider or the worker and the platform. A few papers also provide a holistic perspective by 
considering the concerns of all three agents (see Table A.1).  
Second, we generated a classification of crowdwork platform governance mechanisms by 
inductively coding the identified papers. We began by identifying all the different potential governance 
mechanisms mentioned in the papers. The initial list of codes included incentives, reputation, payment 
rules, decision rights, managing shared resources, managing producer/consumer and task/subtask 
relationships, contractual rights, sharing information between workers, fairness, transparency, security, 
accountability, trust, standardization and ethics. We then grouped similar codes and excluded some (e.g., 
those that were infrequently mentioned and not covered in depth in prior literature, making it difficult 
to articulate their significance in crowdwork platform governance). Iterating back and forth between the 
findings and the governance definitions from existing research, we ultimately (a) differentiated between 
governance mechanisms and the drivers of these mechanisms and (b) postulated two key crowdwork 
platform governance mechanisms (control and coordination) and three drivers of each mechanism (see 
Table A.2). Based on the theoretical and practical significance of the degree of routinization of work 
and the degree of centralization of crowdwork platform governance, we also coded the papers for their 
focus on routine and creative crowdwork as well as centralized, decentralized and hybrid governance. 
Notably, we found no papers on purely decentralized crowdwork platform governance, and the majority 
of papers focus on centralized platform governance of routine crowdwork (Table A.2).  
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Third, we analyzed the selected crowdwork papers with an eye towards identifying the value 
propositions for job providers. The initial list of codes included high quality of work, economic benefit, 
technological efficiency, job provider anonymity, lack of long-term commitment, scalability, and fast 
task completion. Again, we grouped similar codes and excluded those that were infrequently mentioned 
and not covered in depth in prior literature. We converged on five value propositions (Table A.3).  
Synthesizing insights from Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3, we identified key themes and gaps in the 
literature, as described below. We then moved on to develop the conceptual model of crowdwork 
platform governance to fill the identified gaps. 
 
4. Prevalent Themes and Gaps in the Literature 
 
The review revealed two broad themes. The first theme shows that governance by crowdwork 
platforms is generally achieved through control and coordination mechanisms. There are two important 
sub-themes here that also reveal two key gaps in the literature: differences between centralized and 
decentralized platform governance modes and differences between routine and creative crowdwork and 
its governance. The second theme demonstrates an assumption, prevalent in the literature, that effective 
crowdwork platform governance can increase the benefits for job providers; however, there is little 
theoretical or empirical work to support this relationship. We elaborate on each theme below.  
 
4.1 Theme 1: Crowdwork Platform Governance through Control and Coordination 
A dominant idea in this theme is that crowdwork platform governance consists of control and 
coordination mechanisms. Control mechanisms, which are critical for running a successful crowdwork 
platform, include quality control, the reputation system of workers, and the accountability of job 
providers (Table A.2). Quality control and accountability of job providers are forms of formal control 
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(Kirsch, 1997). The former is achieved through direct outcome control (Eisenhardt, 1985), while the 
latter is achieved through behavior control (Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, 1997), where the rules and 
procedures set on worker and job provider behavior are expected to lead to specific outcomes. The 
reputation system of workers, meanwhile, is arguably a form of informal control (Eisenhardt, 1985; 
Kirsch, 1997) that aligns the goals of job providers, platform owners and workers (i.e., workers strive 
for higher reputation scores, which controls their behavior in line with the standards set by the platform 
owner and/or job provider). 
Coordination mechanisms are also important for managing a prosperous crowdwork platform 
and consist of task management, incentive management and contract management (see Table A.2). Task 
management refers to platforms coordinating the flow of information related to dependencies among 
tasks (Crowston, 1997), but it can also allow for mutual adjustment between the workers directly 
(Mintzberg, 1980). Incentive management, meanwhile, refers to the processes of selecting and 
distributing incentives and rewards (beyond reputation) that motivate workers and job providers 
(Vakharia and Lease, 2015). Finally, contract management refers to managing the dependencies between 
types of workers, tasks, and payment rules and conditions (based on Malone and Crowston, 1990). A 
part of contract management is the selection of workers, which is often a multi-stage process in which 
workers decide whether to offer their services (based on task description, financial incentives, rumors 
about job provider, etc.) by submitting bids, and job providers decide which worker(s) to choose based 
on bid evaluations (Malone and Crowston, 1990). 
The review shows that the role of control in crowdwork platform governance receives more 
research attention than does the role of coordination (Hein et al., 2016; Schreieck et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, routine and creative crowdwork platforms are increasingly distinguished in the literature, 
but little is known of how the governance done by platforms differs, or whether it should differ, for 
routine and creative crowdwork. Moreover, the spreading discourse on blockchain technology drives a 
growing interest in decentralized platform governance, but the understanding of its benefits and 
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challenges is only beginning to emerge (Tate et al., 2017), with no studies on decentralized crowdwork 
platform governance and only a few studies on hybrid governance. We unpack each of these gaps in the 
following subsections.  
 
4.1.1 Centralized and Decentralized Crowdwork Platform Governance 
 
       The dominant idea in this sub-theme is the extent to which crowdwork platform governance 
(control and coordination) is (or should be) centralized. The logic of the studies in this theme is that the 
degree of centralization impacts crowdwork platform governance. For example, it has been shown that 
centralized crowdwork platform governance can improve incentives as well as contract management 
through centralized decision-making (Whiting et al., 2016). However, the role of control and 
coordination in centralized and decentralized crowdwork platform governance has not been 
systematically addressed in existing literature. The review indicates that most existing crowdwork 
platforms govern centrally, while only a few studies have tried to design and implement single modules 
inside platforms under decentralized governance (see Table A.2).  
 
4.1.2  Routine and Creative Crowdwork Platforms 
The dominant idea in this sub-theme is the extent to which crowdwork platforms differ (or do 
not differ) in design, governance and value proposition depending on the degree of routinization of work. 
There are different governance challenges in routine and creative crowdwork platforms, such as the lack 
of job provider accountability, high turnover among workers, and standard quality control (Brawley and 
Pury, 2016; Deng et al., 2016). The logic of the studies in this theme conveys that these issues are likely 
to influence the kind of value delivered to job providers, such as the quality of work and the cost of 
labor. The literature shows an increasing number of studies on creative crowdwork platforms in addition 
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to routine platforms (Table A.2). However, little is known regarding the differences between routine 
and creative crowdwork platform governance, and the kind of value these platforms deliver to job 
providers.  
 
4.2 Theme 2: Crowdwork Platform Governance Affects Benefits for Job Providers 
 
Existing crowdwork research assumes that good governance can improve the value generated 
by crowdwork for job providers. As shown in Table A.3, crowdwork is strategically vital for 
organizations (job providers) because it can lower costs and deliver a quick turnaround on tasks (Al-Ani 
and Stumpp, 2016; Agrawal et al., 2015; Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft, 2014; Brawley and Pury, 
2016; Buettner, 2015; Chen and Horton, 2016; Deng and Joshi, 2016; Gould et al., 2016; Gupta et al. 
2014; Harris, 2015; Kittur et al., 2013; Rzeszotarski and Kittur, 2012). However, organizations face 
many challenges in extracting value from crowdwork. For example, a risk of losing control over the 
activities of workers; challenges related to quality control, reputation inflation and complex task 
management; and a high churn rate of crowdworkers all threaten the ability of job providers to achieve 
lower costs and speedy delivery of high-quality results (Deng et al., 2016; Durward et al., 2016; Ma et 
al., 2016). Many of these challenges appear to be related to governance, but there is a lack of studies 
explicitly addressing this relationship.  
Based on the themes and gaps explicated above, in the following section, we develop a 
conceptual model of crowdwork platform governance.  
5. Crowdwork Platform Governance: Mechanisms, Drivers and Outcomes  
In the following sections, we develop a conceptual model of crowdwork platform governance 
(see Fig.1). The central construct of this conceptual model is crowdwork platform governance 
effectiveness, which refers to the degree to which the control and coordination of platform resources and 
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activities help to achieve the desired results (e.g., benefit all stakeholders’ interests) (see Table 2 for the 
definitions of all constructs). Overall, the conceptual model comprises the following components: (1) 
mechanisms, or the processes through which crowdwork platform governance is realized (i.e., 
coordination and control); (2) drivers, or the independent variables that drive the control and 
coordination mechanisms; and (3) value propositions, or the outcomes of crowdwork platform 
governance in terms of value delivered to job providers. In addition, the model specifies two key 
moderating effects: (1) the effect that the degree of centralization of crowdwork platform governance 
has on the relationship between crowdwork platform governance mechanisms and crowdwork platform 
governance effectiveness; and (2) the effect that the degree of routinization of work has on the 
relationship between crowdwork platform governance effectiveness and the value propositions 
delivered to job providers.  
5.1 Mechanisms of Crowdwork Platform Governance Effectiveness 
Based on the literature, we posit that there are two key mechanisms (i.e., processes) through 
which crowdwork platform governance becomes effective. We label these control and coordination 
system efficiency (Table A.2). Efficient joint functioning of control and coordination systems is vital 
for running and managing crowdwork platforms. Control, which comprises formal and informal control, 
monitors and directs the processes and activities within the platform (Schreieck et al., 2016). Meanwhile, 
coordination manages the dependencies between crowdwork activities (e.g., between tasks, between 
workers and job providers) (based on Crowston, 1997; Malone and Crowston, 1994; Kittur et al., 2013). 
   
Control has to do with activities that verify performance outcomes and activities that verify 
workers’ and job providers’ compliance with platform standards and policies. Control system efficiency 
is driven by (1) outcome-oriented formal performance control (Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, 1997), which 
is established by quality control; (2) informal social control (ibid.), which is established by reputation 
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systems of workers; and (3) behavior-oriented formal administrative control (ibid.), which is established 
by the accountability of job providers.  
Coordination has to do with activities that manage the core functionalities of the platform. 
Coordination system efficiency is driven by (1) task management, which coordinates the workflow, 
thereby creating individual but interdependent work plans for each worker, as well as opportunities for 
mutual adjustment (Mintzberg, 1980); (2) incentive management, which coordinates the appropriation 
of incentives used to motivate workers, align stakeholder interests and complement the informal controls 
(Vakharia and Lease, 2015); and (3) contract management, which coordinates the formation of 
agreements between job providers and workers about the terms of work. Contract management is 
essential for creating actionable work plans and setting ground rules, which form the basis for 
verification of compliance by the control system (Malone and Crowston, 1990).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
5.1.1 Control System Efficiency 
The purpose of the control system is to ensure that all activities are carried out in accordance 
with the plan, rectify any mistakes and prevent them from recurring (Fayol, 1949, p. 77). Specifically, 
in crowdwork, the purpose of managerial control systems is to help reach business goals by facilitating 
workers’ participation and eliciting their best performance (Saxton et al., 2013). Accordingly, we define 
control system efficiency as the degree to which the crowdwork platform verifies that all activities that 
are carried out on the platform (e.g., quality assurance) are within the desired range and enables taking 
corrective actions when needed (see Table 2). For example, quality control is key in driving the 
verification of work quality and in taking corrective actions (e.g., well-functioning quality control should 
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avoid false rejections of work and disgruntled workers). The reputation system drives the verification 
of crowdworker identity and qualifications and enables taking corrective actions (e.g., ill-qualified 
workers should be filtered out of the crowdwork platform through low reputation scores) (Horton and 
Golden, 2015). Accountability of job providers drives the verification of job provider identity and 
responsibility towards workers, with unscrupulous job providers being filtered out of the platform.  
Taken together, an efficient control system (which verifies that all activities carried out on the 
platform are within the desired range and makes it possible for corrective actions to be taken) positively 
affects crowdwork platform governance effectiveness. Thus, we posit that: 
P1. Control system efficiency has a positive effect on crowdwork platform governance 
effectiveness. 
 
5.1.2 Coordination System Efficiency 
The purpose of the coordination system is to handle the core functionalities of the platform and 
to manage the interdependencies among them. Thus, we define coordination system efficiency as the 
degree to which the crowdwork platform manages the dependencies among crowdwork activities (e.g., 
between tasks, between workers and job providers) (Table 2). Coordination in crowdwork platform 
governance is vital to improving workflows and work output (Gray et al., 2016). For example, managing 
dependencies between tasks and sub-tasks drives the ability to coordinate large-scale tasks and improves 
the completion and acceptance rates of such tasks (Chen et al., 2014). Incentive management, 
meanwhile, manages the dependencies between workers’ performance and different types of rewards 
available to them (Harris and Wu, 2014). For example, high pricing of tasks lowers the output for the 
job provider due to budgetary constraints. Conversely, low pricing of tasks results in worker 
dissatisfaction regardless of reputation earned (Goel et al., 2013). Therefore, managing the dependency 
between performance and incentives can help balance the limited budget of the job providers and the 
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opportunistic behavior of crowdworkers (Goel et al., 2013). Contract management handles the 
dependencies among job provider, platform and worker. The presence (or absence) of contracts and their 
conditions is vital in crowdwork platform governance, as different contracts have varying payment 
structures (Agrawal et al., 2015; Vakharia and Lease, 2015) and place distinct demands on platform and 
stakeholder resources. Thus, contract management is essential for creating actionable work plans and 
setting ground rules. 
Taken together, an efficient coordination system (that manages the dependencies among 
crowdwork activities) positively affects crowdwork platform governance effectiveness. Thus, we posit 
that: 
P2. Coordination system efficiency has a positive effect on crowdwork platform governance 
effectiveness. 
 
5.2 Drivers of Crowdwork Platform Governance Mechanisms  
Each of the two identified crowdwork platform governance mechanisms (i.e., control and 
coordination system efficiency) is driven by three key drivers (Table A.2). Control system efficiency is 
driven by quality control, the reputation system of workers and the accountability of job providers. 
Coordination system efficiency is driven by task, incentive and contract management. We examine the 
effect of these drivers on control and coordination system efficiency in the following sections. 
 
5.2.1 Quality Control 
Quality control refers to the evaluation schemes that assess the degree to which a submitted 
work meets the set requirements or specifications of a job (Table 2). Quality control enables the 
assessment of work performance as well as the correction of mistakes in submitted works (Vakharia and 
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Lease, 2015). Quality control deals with the algorithms and processes that are applied to assess work 
quality, as well as with the techniques and methods that are utilized to monitor workers and their 
accomplishment of work (Vakharia and Lease, 2015). For example, in Clickworker, plagiarism 
checking, peer review, and testing are utilized to assess work quality (Vakharia and Lease, 2015).  
Therefore, quality control that effectively establishes outcome control positively affects the 
overall control efficiency of crowdwork platform governance by assessing work performance and 
revealing errors in submitted works. Thus, we posit that: 
P3. Quality control has a positive effect on control system efficiency. 
 
5.2.2 Reputation System of Workers 
Reputation system of workers refers to the effectiveness of the reputation scheme – that is, the 
degree to which the system motivates workers to be competent and to comply with the rules of conduct 
(Table 2). Reputation systems function as an informal social control method that motivates workers’ 
compliant behavior.  There are different reputation systems from one platform to another. For example, 
TopCoder uses rating algorithms (Boudreau et al., 2016), while workers in other freelance platforms are 
monitored via activity logs. In many crowdwork platforms, such as AMT, the reputation rates are 
derived from job providers’ feedback (Whiting et al., 2016). All reputation systems are designed to 
provide a reliable indication of the worker’s future performance (Whiting et al., 2016) but also to 
function as an instrument of control that reinforces compliance. However, online reputation scores may 
also motivate bribes, begging, and threats (Horton and Golden, 2015). For instance, the lack of a reliable 
reputation system in AMT has led to crowdworkers enhancing their ratings by tacitly or explicitly 
agreeing to mutually recommend each other (Kittur et al., 2013).  
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  Therefore, a reputation system that effectively institutes informal social control positively 
affects the overall control efficiency of crowdwork platform governance by motivating workers to be 
competent and to comply with the rules of conduct. Thus, we posit that: 
P4. Reputation system of workers has a positive effect on control system efficiency. 
 
5.2.3 Accountability of Job Providers 
Accountability of job providers refers to the job provider’s degree of answerability – that is, the 
degree to which job providers can be called upon to explain their decisions and actions with regard to 
submitted work (Table 2).  Accountability of job providers functions as an administrative control that 
motivates job providers’ compliant behavior. On AMT and many other crowdwork platforms, job 
providers can reject work without compensation or explanation, regardless of the actual quality of work 
(Brawley and Pury, 2016; Deng et al., 2016; Gaikwad et al., 2015). Exceptions include TopCoder, where 
feedback is provided to all workers, regardless of whether the submitted work is accepted or rejected. 
Accountability, thus, would require job providers to give a reason for rejecting work and serve as a 
deterrent to unfair or mistaken rejections.  
Therefore, accountability of job providers that effectively institutes administrative control 
positively affects the overall control efficiency of crowdwork platform governance by motivating job 
providers to be fair and to comply with the rules of conduct. Thus, we posit that: 
P5. Accountability of job providers has a positive effect on control system efficiency. 
5.2.4 Task Management 
Task management refers to the degree to which a crowdwork platform manages the 
interdependencies between tasks with different characteristics (e.g., task importance, task diversity, job 
autonomy, and task clarity) (Deng and Joshi, 2016). Task management includes various activities, such 
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as dividing complex tasks into subtasks, managing and merging those subtasks (Kittur et al., 2013), as 
well as facilitating mutual adjustment among workers performing inter-dependent tasks (Mintzberg, 
1980). Task management is particularly crucial in the case of complex tasks with many dependencies 
and a need for multiple types of skill (Kittur et al., 2013).    
Therefore, task management that orchestrates the sequencing and distribution of sub-tasks to 
willing and able workers (and allows for adjustments to this sequencing and distribution) affects the 
overall coordination efficiency of crowdwork platform governance by coordinating the pace and flow 
of work. Thus, we posit that:  
P6: Task management has a positive effect on coordination system efficiency. 
 
5.2.5 Incentive Management 
Incentive management refers to the degree to which crowdwork platform governance manages 
dependencies between workers’ performance and the incentives and rewards available to them.  
Incentive management is applied to increase worker participation and improve work practices through 
allocating incentives in a way that benefits both job providers and workers (Kittur et al., 2013; Vakharia 
and Lease, 2015) beyond the effects of informal and formal control (e.g., reputation and quality control). 
Understanding and rewarding desired behavior is a challenge in crowdwork platforms (Kittur 
et al., 2013). Studies have shown mixed consequences of the impact of financial incentives on the quality 
of workers’ submissions and emphasize the importance of intrinsic motivations, such as nonfinancial 
awards and credit, importance of tasks, and a collaborative atmosphere (Kittur et al., 2013; Mason and 
Watts, 2009). Therefore, incentive management also involves job providers’ clear communication of 
desired behaviors. Furthermore, the alignment of these desired behaviors with worker incentives and 
motivations goes beyond control mechanisms (Kittur et al., 2013; Khanna et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2010). 
For example, incentive management includes making coordinated decisions about the degree to which 
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incentives should be utilized individually or in combination, as well as making decisions about intrinsic 
vs. extrinsic rewards and managing them for competing effects (Vakharia and Lease, 2015). 
Therefore, incentive management that clearly articulates the decisions regarding and 
distribution of incentives affects the overall coordination efficiency of crowdwork platform governance 
by aligning the interests of workers and job providers. Thus, we posit that:  
P7. Incentive management has a positive effect on coordination system efficiency. 
 
5.2.6 Contract Management 
Contract management refers to the degree to which the contracts that govern work arrangements 
make it possible for the platform to manage interdependencies between job providers and workers. 
Contract management is a core functionality of the platform that coordinates work planning and the 
terms of a particular job, including job specifications, deadlines, delivery format, rules of engagement, 
and dispute resolution (Howcroft and Bergvall-Kåreborn, 2018). Given the lack of a personal 
relationship (or even a lack of direct communication) between the workers and job provider, the contract 
serves as the main point of reference for all parties.  Contracts that are used to manage and coordinate 
the work may range in nature and complexity from general terms and conditions (e.g., AMT), to fixed 
price boilerplate contracts (e.g., 99design), to contracts with specific rules and conditions (e.g., 
TopCoder) (Agrawal et al., 2015; Vakharia and Lease, 2015).  
Therefore, contract management that explicitly articulates the work arrangements on a platform 
affects the overall coordination efficiency of crowdwork platform governance by delineating the 
transactional engagement between job providers and workers. Thus, we posit that: 
P8. Contract management has a positive effect on coordination system efficiency. 
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5.3 Crowdwork Platform Governance and Value Creation for Job Providers 
Understanding the conditions for creating value-adding crowdwork poses an important strategic 
issue for many businesses. In this section, we focus specifically on the value propositions of crowdwork 
for job providers (Table A.3) and theorize on how crowdwork platform governance effectiveness affects 
them. As these propositions are largely synthesized from extant research, we have kept this section brief.  
 
5.3.1 Effective Crowdwork Platform Governance and Quality of Work 
Quality of work refers to the degree to which a work task submitted meets the job specifications 
(Table 2). While better financial incentives do not necessarily lead to improvements in work quality 
(Kingsley et al., 2015), it has been shown that detailed and well-made task descriptions (part of task 
management) and quality control (QC) do increase the quality of work (Harris, 2015). Therefore, we 
expect that effective crowdwork platform governance – that is, the degree to which the control and 
coordination of platform resources and activities help to achieve desired results – positively affects the 
quality of work produced, increasing the value of crowdwork to job providers. Thus, we posit that: 
P9. Effective crowdwork platform governance has a positive effect on the quality of work. 
 
5.3.2 Effective Crowdwork Platform Governance, Cost of Labor and Work Delivery Time 
Cost of labor refers to financial compensation paid by a job provider to crowdworkers in 
exchange for a work task accomplished, and work delivery time refers to the time it takes for 
crowdworkers to complete a work task (Table 2). “Fast” and “cheap” have been the main value 
propositions of crowdwork platforms for job providers since their inception (Gupta et al., 2014; Harris 
and Srinivasan, 2012; Kittur et al., 2013).  Costs associated with crowdwork tend to be considerably 
lower than those related with more traditional systems of employment, and profit growth is a significant 
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motivator for adoption (Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft, 2014; Gupta et al., 2014). Effective 
crowdwork platform governance (through, for example, quality control) can reduce delivery time, while 
flexible contract and incentive management can reduce the costs of labor.  
Therefore, we expect that effective crowdwork platform governance negatively affects (i.e., 
reduces) the cost of labor and the time it takes for crowd workers to complete a work task. Thus, we 
posit that:  
P10. Effective crowdwork platform governance has a negative effect on the cost of labor (i.e., 
cost decrease). 
P11. Effective crowdwork platform governance has a negative effect on work delivery time (i.e., 
delivery time decrease). 
 
5.3.3 Effective Crowdwork Platform Governance and Scalability of Workforce 
Scalability of workforce refers to the ability of the job provider to adapt the workforce size in 
response to market demand fluctuations (Table 2). Many freelance platforms appeal to job providers 
because they provide scalability and flexibility of workforce capacity through access to a large pool of 
varying levels of skill and experience without employment regulations (Alonso and Mizzaro, 2012; 
Agrawal et al., 2015; Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft, 2014; Brawley and Pury, 2016; Buhrmester et 
al., 2011). However, lack of regulations can also lead to unfair treatment of workers and threaten the 
long-term sustainability of crowdwork (Kittur et al., 2013). Therefore, crowdwork platform governance 
through accountable providers, well-managed tasks and contracts is likely to attract well-qualified 
workers.  
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Therefore, we expect that effective crowdwork platform governance positively affects the 
ability of job providers to adapt the workforce size through the pool of crowdworkers available to them 
on the platform. Thus, we posit that:  
P12. Effective crowdwork platform governance has a positive effect on the scalability of the 
workforce. 
 
5.3.4 Effective Crowdwork Platform Governance and Reputation of Job Provider 
Reputation of the job provider refers to the general standing of a job provider among the 
crowdworkers (Table 2). Since most crowdwork platforms currently offer no functionality to capture 
job provider reputation, crowdworkers tend to construct an idea of the reputation of job providers based 
on their behavior on the platform, and share this information through other means. For example, in 
AMT, this information can reach workers via several external forums that crowdworkers use to evaluate 
job providers (Brawley and Pury, 2016). In many platforms, job providers also do not have to reveal 
their true identity; thus, their reputation is often entirely dependent on their behavior on the platform. 
Crowdworkers, particularly more experienced ones, use this information to refuse to collaborate with 
job providers known to exhibit unfair behavior (Brawley and Pury, 2016; Deng et al., 2016). However, 
it has also been shown that workers can be appeased when job providers give reasonable justifications 
for rejecting their work (Chen and Horton, 2016). Thus, effective crowdwork platform governance, 
through holding job providers accountable, is one way to influence job provider reputation positively.  
Therefore, we expect that effective crowdwork platform governance positively affects the 
reputation of a job provider among the crowdworkers. Thus, we posit that:  









The degree to which the control and 
coordination of platform resources and 
activities help to achieve the desired 
results (e.g., benefit the stakeholders’ 
interests) (based on Manner et al., 2012). 
TopCoder uses a combination of complex 
quality controls via algorithms and 
reviewers, a reputation system based on 
workers’ skills and the number of winning 
bids, task management through project 
managers and highly-skilled workers 
(copilots)6 who have a contract with 
TopCoder, and incentive management (e.g., 




The degree to which crowdwork platform 
governance verifies that the activities that 
are carried out on the platform (e.g., 
workers’ and job providers’ compliance, 
work quality assurance) are within the 
desired range and enables taking corrective 
actions when needed (based on Fayol, 
1949; Saxton et al., 2013). 
TopCoder’s control system can verify crowd 
workers’ identity and take corrective action 
in the event that workers use fake usernames 
to increase their reputation.  
Coordination System 
Efficiency 
The degree to which crowdwork platform 
governance manages the dependencies 
among the work-related activities that are 
carried out on the platform (e.g., contract 
management, task management, incentive 
management) (based on Crowston, 1997; 
Malone and Crowston, 1994).  
TopCoder uses a coordination mechanism via 
project managers and copilots to manage 
dependencies among complex tasks. These 
managers and copilots divide tasks into 
smaller tasks, decide whether the tasks should 
run in parallel or sequentially, and merge the 
final accomplished subtasks to deliver the 
work to the job provider. 
Quality Control 
 
The evaluation schemes that assess the 
degree to which a submitted work meets 
the set requirements or the specification of 
a job (Agrawal et al., 2015; Wais et al., 
2010). 
 
Clickworker uses plagiarism checks and peer 
review to assess the quality of the work 
produced (Vakharia and Lease, 2015). 
 
Reputation System of 
Workers 
 
The effectiveness of the reputation 
scheme, that is, the degree to which the 
system motivates workers to be competent 
and to comply with the rules of conduct 
(Whiting et al., 2016). 
Upwork uses ratings ranging from 1 to 5 as 
the reputation scheme, based on scores given 
by job providers to workers. 
 
6 Copilots are highly-skilled workers who have received a promotion on the TopCoder platform and now run 
projects on the platform. 
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Construct Definition Example 
Accountability of Job 
Provider 
The degree of job providers’ answerability 
– that is, the degree to which job provider 
can be called upon to explain their 
decisions and actions with regard to 
submitted work (based on Wood and 
Winston, 2007). 
TopCoder provides feedback from reviewers 
and job providers to workers who are 
interested in the reasons for rejection. 
However, in AMT job providers can reject 
work without giving a reason (Brawley and 
Pury, 2016; Deng et al., 2016). 
Task Management 
 
The degree to which crowdwork platform 
governance manages the interdependencies 
among tasks (e.g., managing subtasks and 
distributing them among workers with 
various expertise and capabilities) (Kittur et 
al., 2013).  
Clickworker platform manages tasks 
according to the job provider’s requirements 
and compatibility of the worker. TopCoder 
uses project managers and highly-skilled 
workers to decompose tasks and run them in 
parallel or sequentially. 
Incentive Management 
 
The degree to which crowdwork platform 
governance manages the interdependencies 
between worker’s performance and the 
incentives and rewards available to them 
(Harris and Wu, 2014).  
AMT job providers may provide extra 
incentives to workers in the form of a reward 
payment (Harris, 2015). TopCoder awards 
prizes to winners (Kittur et al., 2013). 
Contract Management The degree to which the work contracts 
make it possible for the platform to 
manage interdependencies between job 
providers and workers (Agrawal et al., 
2015; Vakharia and Lease, 2015). 
AMT facilitates routine work based on a set 
fee but does not provide a contract. 
However, most platforms that facilitate 
creative work, like Upwork, support two 
types of contracts: hourly wage and fixed 
price (Agrawal et al., 2015; Vakharia and 
Lease, 2015). 
Quality of Work 
 
The degree to which a work task submitted 
meets the job specifications or the 
requirements of the job provider (Sarasua 
and Thimm, 2014).  
 
AMT, 99designs and most other crowdwork 
platforms measure the quality of work only 
based on job provider’s acceptance or 
rejection of the work.  
 
Cost of Labor  
 
Financial compensation paid by a job 
provider to crowdworkers in exchange for a 
work task accomplished (Agrawal et al., 
2015; Kittur et al., 2013).   
AMT’s average cost of labor is $2/hour. 
Work Delivery Time The time it takes for crowd workers to 
complete a work task (Gupta et al., 2014; 
Rzeszotarski and Kittur, 2012). 
AMT’s crowdworkers accept and submit a 
task in 39 minutes on average (Brawley and 
Pury, 2016). 
Scalability of Workforce The ability of job provider to adapt the 
workforce size in response to market 
demand fluctuations (Buhrmester et al., 
2011; Alonso and Mizzaro, 2012). 
TopCoder has more than one million 
registered crowdworkers7, and AMT has 
about 500,000 registered crowdworkers 
worldwide (Difallah et al., 2018). The larger 
 
7 https://www.topcoder.com/blog/1-million-members-strong/ (retrieved 16 October 2018)  
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Construct Definition Example 
the pool of workers, the better job providers 
are able to adapt their workforce size to 
market demand (Alonso and Mizaaro, 2012).  
Reputation of Job 
Provider 
 
The general standing of a job provider 
among the crowdworkers (Brawley and 
Pury, 2016).   
AMT’s external forums provide information 
about job providers’ behaviors through 
workers’ review and discussion of job 
providers and tasks. 
Degree of Centralization  The extent to which crowdwork platform 
governance (i.e., the control and 
coordination systems) is centralized, 
ranging from centralized to decentralized 
(Azfar et al., 2001; Scholz, 2016). 
AMT and Upwork use centralized 
governance. There are no examples of 
completely decentralized crowdwork 
platform governance based on the literature 
review.  
Degree of Routinization  The extent to which the tasks are 
accomplished through a repetitive work 
process that follows explicitly prescribed 
simple instructions and requires minimal 
individual creativity from workers 
(Buettner 2015; Margaryan, 2016).  
AMT tasks are more routine (e.g., tagging 
pictures and filling surveys), whereas 
Upwork tasks are more creative (e.g., web 




5.4   Contingencies of Crowdwork Platform Governance  
Most platforms, for both routine and creative crowdwork, govern through centralized schemes 
(Table A.2), with a few exceptions in which governance is done through a hybrid model (e.g., some 
specific drivers of governance, such as reputation and quality control, are managed in a decentralized 
manner). For instance, Whiting et al. (2016) designed and developed crowd guilds, which are 
decentralized groups of workers who certify the quality of each other’s work collectively via a double-
blind peer assessment. Most studies of crowdwork also focus on routine work platforms, like AMT, 
while there are only a few studies on platforms for creative work, like Upwork (Table A.2). Nonetheless, 
as highlighted earlier, recent research is increasingly suggesting that many of the challenges of 
crowdwork could be eliminated, and its benefits enhanced, if it were to go beyond traditional centralized 
arrangements by drawing on ideas of cooperativism and worker-owned and -managed platforms 
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(Gaikwad et al., 2015; Scholz, 2016). The emergence of new technical architectures can help to realize 
these seemingly utopic decentralized governance schemes (Tate et al., 2017). Similarly, with microtask 
crowdwork platforms such as AMT suffering from a bad reputation and an exodus of workers (Deng et 
al., 2016), job providers must increasingly consider whether crowdwork is also suitable for more 
complex and creative tasks, as well as how to best govern creative crowdwork. For these reasons, we 
theorize on how the degree of centralization of platform governance and the degree of routinization of 
crowdwork may change some of the relationships outlined above.  
 
5.4.1 Degree of Centralization of Crowdwork Platform Governance  
The degree of centralization refers to the extent to which the crowdwork platform governance 
(i.e., the control and coordination systems) is centralized (Table 2). As such, we expect that the degree 
of centralization will moderate the effect of control and coordination mechanisms on crowdwork 
platform governance effectiveness.  
With regard to control, centralized governance lowers costs and permits more control by upper 
management (in this case, platform owners and job providers), whereas decentralized governance 
delegates more control to workers (Baschab and Piot, 2007). By removing hierarchical power structures, 
decentralization of governance can decrease the misuse of power (Azfar et al., 2001). For example, 
blockchain technology can enable swift dispute resolution through the transparency provided by an audit 
trail of all transactions (i.e., job submission time, job assessment outcome); in addition, when the terms 
of a job are met, a payment can be made automatically via a smart contract that cannot be manipulated 
by any party (Tate et al., 2017). Thus, non-payment for accepted work (i.e., wage theft) would become 
inconceivable. Part of job provider accountability would, in essence, be coded into the platform 
architecture. In the current centralized systems, like AMT, wage theft happens regularly (Irani, 2015b) 
and exposes a clear deficiency in the control system (lack of job provider accountability).  
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Therefore, we posit that verification and corrective action (control) will have a relatively 
stronger positive effect on crowdwork platform governance effectiveness in centralized platforms, 
because verification and corrective action provide the mechanism that forces all stakeholders to abide 
by the rules and curtails misuse of power.  Conversely, verification and corrective action will have a 
relatively weaker positive effect on crowdwork platform governance effectiveness in decentralized 
platforms, because decentralization of control requires that all stakeholders abide by their collectively-
created rules, some of which may be coded into the platform (Azfar et al., 2001). Thus: 
P14a. Degree of centralization has a positive moderation effect on the relationship between the 
control system and crowdwork platform governance effectiveness.  
Centralization usually improves coordination, including resource allocation, incentive and 
contract management. Knowledge management and distribution of tasks and rewards can be easier and 
faster, as the basic questions of ‘who does what, when, and what do they get for it’ are decided centrally, 
thus not requiring time-consuming discussions or consensus (Whiting et al., 2016). Conversely, 
decentralized governance creates coordination challenges and demands for laborious consensus-based 
decision making. Recent research (Tate et al., 2017) suggests that blockchain-based decentralized 
contract management can result in flexibility (the terms of smart contracts are, by definition, 
programmable) but also irreversibility and networked integrity (once a contract is published, any 
changes in it will be observable to the network, immutable, and applied equally). These many benefits, 
however, do not change the facts that (1) setting up such a smart contract system is necessary in a 
decentralized system (whereas a centralized system can function without contracts, with the 
intermediary platform serving as the ‘trusted’ third party arbitrator), and (2) setting up such a system 
will take some effort and, thus, will incur costs on the platform (and indirectly on job providers and 
workers).  
Therefore, we expect that the management of dependencies (coordination) will have a relatively stronger 
positive effect on crowdwork platform governance effectiveness in decentralized platforms, because the 
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management of dependencies between workers and job providers, tasks and incentives is essential in 
aligning stakeholder interests and actions in decentralized governance.  Conversely, when coordination 
is centralized, everyone’s interests and actions are aligned with those of the central actor through control; 
thus, less coordination effort is needed (Azfar et al., 2001).  Thus:  
P14b. Degree of centralization has a negative moderation effect on the relationship between 
the coordination system and crowdwork platform governance effectiveness.  
 
5.4.2 Degree of Routinization 
The degree of routinization refers to the extent to which crowdwork tasks are accomplished 
through a repetitive work process that follows explicitly prescribed simple instructions and requires 
minimal individual creativity from workers (Table 2). Governance challenges have been found in both 
routine and creative crowdwork platforms (Brawley and Pury, 2016; Deng et al., 2016; Schörpf et al., 
2017). For example, in AMT, the lack of job provider accountability has spawned external forums for 
information sharing among workers and high turn-over (Brawley and Pury, 2016; Deng et al., 2016). In 
creative crowdwork platforms, such as Upwork and 99designs, workers depend heavily on job provider 
ratings (e.g., to have access to higher paid jobs) and, thus, engage in the strategic selection of jobs to 
build up their reputation. At the same time, creative crowdworkers feel that they often do the work out 
of interest, rather than financial incentives (“how low will I go?” often being the operating principle on 
price) (Schörpf et al., 2017). These issues are likely to have an effect on the quality of work, cost of 
labor, and other outcomes that job providers value. As such, we expect that the degree of routinization 
of work tasks will moderate the effect of crowdwork platform governance effectiveness on the value 
delivered to job providers.  
With regard to the quality of work, it is clear that the routine work of repetitive tasks with “clear 
definitions” (Buettner, 2015) will (a) be easier to evaluate and (b) vary less in the quality of the output. 
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Therefore, we posit that effective control and coordination are likely to have only a limited impact on 
improving quality:  
P15a. Degree of routinization has a negative moderation effect on the relationship between 
crowdwork platform governance effectiveness and quality of work.  
 
With regard to cost of labor and work delivery time, routine crowdwork also varies little in 
terms of the financial compensation provided (average $2/hour on AMT) and also in terms of the time 
it takes to accomplish microtasks (average of 39 minutes on AMT; see Table 2). Thus, because in routine 
work the costs are already low and the average delivery time is short, we argue that effective crowdwork 
platform governance has inherently a limited effect and consequently limited impact on these outcomes. 
Conversely, in creative work, effective crowdwork platform governance (e.g., well-defined contracts, 
well-functioning QC) can reduce costs of labor and delivery time more significantly. Evidence suggests 
that in creative platforms (e.g., Upwork), financial compensation for different jobs varies significantly, 
as does the complexity of tasks (Schörpf et al., 2017). In sum, we suggest that:  
P15b. Degree of routinization has a negative moderation effect on the relationship between 
crowdwork platform governance effectiveness and cost of labor. 
P15c. Degree of routinization has a negative moderation effect on the relationship between 
crowdwork platform governance effectiveness and work delivery time.  
 
With regard to the scalability of workforce – that is, the ability of job provider to adapt the 
workforce size by having access to an adaptable pool of crowdworkers with varying skills (Alonso and 
Mizzaro, 2012; Agrawal, et al, 2015; Brawley and Pury, 2016; Buhrmester et al., 2011) – we expect that 
the workforce available for routine tasks is inherently more scalable because of the sheer size of the 
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potential pool. While TopCoder is estimated to have more workers than AMT (about one million versus 
500,000; see Table 2), TopCoder’s workers are divided into programmers, designers and data scientists 
with different skills and areas of expertise. Thus, whereas all AMT’s workers can, in principle, perform 
nearly any of the micro tasks posted on the platform, on TopCoder, worker and task types are more 
difficult to match. Therefore effective crowdwork platform governance is likely to have only a limited 
impact on the scalability of workforce provided by routine crowdwork platforms, while it is likely to 
enhance the scalability afforded by creative platforms. Thus, we posit that:  
P15d. Degree of routinization has a negative moderation effect on the relationship between 
crowdwork platform governance effectiveness and the scalability of the workforce. 
 
Finally, with regard to the reputation of job providers, it has been shown that accountability of 
job providers influences the behavior of workers doing both routine and creative crowdwork. Thus, we 
expect that effective crowdwork platform governance, in terms of holding job providers accountable, 
positively affects job provider reputation regardless of the degree of routinization (Brawley and Pury, 
2016; Schörpf et al., 2017).  Therefore, we do not posit a moderation effect in this case.  
 
6 Implications for the Future of Value-Adding Crowdwork  
Crowdwork is a new form of digitally mediated employment that involves the performance of 
tasks online for a fee by distributed independent workers. Crowdwork is performed through platforms, 
which function as intermediaries that orchestrate and facilitate the work through a set of governance 
mechanisms that control and coordinate the work process. As a novel socio-technical phenomenon that 
has the capacity to change the nature of work organization and to provide strategic value to workers and 
job providers alike, crowdwork is disrupting contemporary working arrangements (Forman et al., 2014) 
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while also creating significant negative backlash, particularly because of reported unfair treatment of 
workers (Deng et al., 2016; Kittur et al., 2013). Thus, in this paper we set out to better understand how 
crowdwork platform governance delivers on this promise of strategic value to job providers, while also 
providing fair working conditions.   
The contribution of this paper lies in advancing the conceptualization of crowdwork platform 
governance. The paper provides a coherent theoretical grounding for describing and investigating 
crowdwork platform governance arrangements through control and coordination mechanisms. We also 
highlight the role of the degree of centralization of platform governance and the degree of routinization 
of work as critical moderators of crowdwork platform governance effectiveness and its impact on job 
provider benefit. Furthermore, we offer new theoretical insights that lead to the consideration of 
additional value propositions for job providers, especially with regard to the quality of work and 
reputation of job providers, which are not often discussed in current literature on crowdwork platforms. 
In sum, building on prior crowdwork platforms research, this paper extends the construct of governance 
in the context of crowdwork platforms, discusses its relevance and benefits to job providers, and 
provides substantive directions for future research in the form of a set of propositions. We leave it to 
future research to extend this theoretical work by operationalizing and testing the proposed model. Next, 
we consider the theoretical and practical implications of the proposed model.  
First, by unpacking crowdwork platform governance into two key mechanisms (control and 
coordination), we contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the crowdwork governance 
phenomenon. As highlighted earlier, prior research has often discussed governance issues in crowdwork 
platforms, but definitions have been broad and systematic investigations into governance scant 
(Nickerson et al., 2017). In particular, while control is often mentioned in the platform and crowd 
governance literature (e.g., Tiwana, et al., 2010), coordination is rarely mentioned. Most extant 
crowdwork literature talks of “management” (Deng et al., 2016), but the concept remains vague. Thus, 
this paper makes headway by deriving the definition and significance of the coordination mechanisms 
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in crowdwork platform governance. While control is obviously important in all governance, we think 
coordination is particularly significant in crowdwork, because managing dependencies (e.g., between 
tasks, workers and job providers, incentives and performance) is key when work is temporary, large-
scale, distributed, and mediated. Future research could further focus on the empirical examination of 
the coordination mechanism and its functioning in different crowdwork arrangements. Coordination is 
also of particular importance in decentralized crowdwork platform governance, as explained below.  
The moderating effect of the degree of centralization highlights that the control mechanism is 
more critical to effective centralized crowdwork platform governance, whereas the coordination 
mechanism is more critical to effective decentralized crowdwork platform governance. Control, in terms 
of verification and corrective action, will have a stronger positive impact on centralized crowdwork 
platform governance effectiveness, which is more likely to suffer from power imbalances and power 
misuse (Azfar et al., 2001; Zyskind et al., 2015). Conversely, coordination, in terms of managing 
dependencies, will have a stronger positive impact on decentralized crowdwork platform governance 
effectiveness, which is more likely to suffer from disconnects, perturbations, process breakdowns, and 
laborious demands for consensus-based decision-making (Whiting et al., 2016). This also highlights that 
while the promise of decentralized platform architecture is becoming palpable with new technologies 
like blockchain (Tate et al., 2017), governance challenges, particularly those related to coordination, 
will likely increase in the short-term. Thus, if the future of crowdwork is decentralized, coordination 
(and the task, incentive and contract management that drive it) will be the key to ensuring its success 
and strategic value to job providers.  
From a strategic perspective, maintaining the quality and scalability of highly-skilled workforce 
through better governance can improve organizational dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) through 
the ability to: (1) adjust their production capacity on the go to meet the ebbs and flows of the market 
demand (Lepak and Snell, 1999), (2) execute pilots on innovation projects without disrupting the work 
of the permanent staff, or on emergent innovation that requires ad hoc skills, unavailable in the 
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organization (Kittur et al., 2013), and (3) reach out to the “wisdom of the crowds” (Majchrzak and 
Malhotra, 2013). These three operational improvements are known to drive strategic value in terms of 
increasing organizational agility and generative capacity.  
Second, the conceptual model helps us to theorize on what we consider the future of crowdwork. 
Based on trends in society and technology, as well as initial lessons learned from crowdwork 
arrangements reported in the literature, we expect that crowdwork will evolve beyond the current 
centralized governance arrangements (Gaikwad et al., 2015; Scholz, 2016; Tate et al., 2017) and will 
also have to become suitable for increasingly complex and creative tasks (Schörpf et al., 2017). 
Crowdwork has long since expanded beyond microtasks into citizen journalism, motor vehicle design, 
text editing, and similar work that requires ingenuity and professional expertise.  These shifts, however, 
are also important to consider in governance, because, as the conceptual model shows, the degree of 
routinization of work impacts the extent to which effective crowdwork platform governance can 
influence the value that crowdwork generates. Specifically, the moderating effect of the degree of 
routinization on the relationships between crowdwork platform governance and the value propositions 
highlights that effective crowdwork platform governance is critical to overall value generation in non-
routine work. Effective control and coordination are expected to have a strong positive impact on work 
quality, to reduce costs further, and to improve work delivery time in creative (i.e., non-routine) 
crowdwork platforms. Thus, we expect that effective crowdwork platform governance will become 
increasingly important as job providers increasingly move to crowdwork arrangements for more 
complex and creative tasks. However, with routine crowdwork platforms suffering from unfair working 
conditions, high turnover and bad reputation (Deng et al., 2016; Kittur et al., 2013), their long-term 
sustainability is also in question and can be improved through better governance.  
We summarize these thoughts about the future of value-adding crowdwork into a two-
dimensional framework (Table 3), which we hope can serve as a guide for both researchers and 
practitioners (especially job providers).  
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        Table 3 
        Future of Value-Adding Crowdwork 




Digital Sweatshop Talent Factory  
Decentralized Crowdwork 
Platform Governance 
Day-labor Marketplace  Talent Marketplace  
   
In Table 3, we provide four metaphors for different crowdwork arrangements based on the 
degree of centralization of crowdwork platform governance and the degree of routinization of work 
tasks. The digital sweatshop (Pittman and Sheehan, 2016) and talent factory metaphors dominate the 
current crowdwork platforms that are characterized by centralized governance. The digital sweatshop 
refers to crowdwork sites like AMT, which operate with the principle of keeping costs down and profits 
up with little regard for the working conditions created for workers or the tools provided for job 
providers to extract value from crowdwork (e.g., no quality control scheme). This operating principle 
relies on outsourcing simple jobs to low-skilled, cheap labor with few alternative job opportunities. 
Conversely, the talent factory refers to crowdwork platforms that deal with more creative and complex 
work (e.g., Upwork, TopCoder). While talent implies value and the need for nurturing, the talent factory 
metaphor emphasizes the Tayloristic and functional attitude towards work organization (Donini et al., 
2017). The talent factory metaphor emphasizes the ability of a platform to deliver, on-demand, the right 
individuals with the right skills (Hewitt, 2009; Ready and Conger, 2007). In contrast to these metaphors, 
we suggest that future crowdwork platforms, which will be increasingly characterized by decentralized 
governance, will evoke day-labor and talent marketplace metaphors. While the operating principles of 
routine and creative work are still in place, both metaphors denote a shift in power; in these scenarios, 
both low- and high-skilled workers have more control over whom they sell their skills to at market price 
(Lee, 2014).  
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 These four metaphors offer a useful starting point for job providers and platform owners to 
strategically think about work organization and platform design. Centrally governed platforms served 
as a stepping stone into establishing early forms of crowdwork. However, the emergence of 
decentralized governance – through, for example, blockchain technologies – is paving the way for the 
evolution of crowdwork platforms into a more cost-effective and equitable work ecosystem.  
 
7 Conclusion  
In conclusion, building on this theory review and conceptual model development, we provided 
a deeper insight into crowdwork platform governance, which could be used to inform employers, 
platform designers, and policymakers who have the power to forge a more attractive future of 
crowdwork for both job providers and crowdworkers. We hope to demonstrate that one avenue for such 
a shift lies in revisiting our assumptions concerning what crowdwork arrangements look like and 
rethinking the design and role of platforms in crowdwork. Particularly in the domain of low-skilled 
work, the platform can play a more prominent role in the integration of labor than is desirable; that is, it 
can describe and direct the work using Tayloristic hetero-direction (Donini et al., 2017).  We suggest 
that addressing these issues should go beyond improving existing platform designs (such as updating 
AMT) to consider entirely novel, alternative platform designs. In summary, we are cautiously optimistic 
about the future potential of crowdwork to contribute to inclusion, equitable wages and flexible work 
arrangements for workers, while organizations can keep costs of labor in check and smoothly adjust to 
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Kittur et al. 
(2013) 
Outlines a general framework for the future of 
crowdwork that is fair and meaningful for workers and 
produces high-quality work for job providers 
+ + + 
Deng et al. 
(2016) 
Identifies crowdworker values (access, autonomy, 
fairness, transparency, communication, security, 
accountability, making an impact, and dignity); offers 




Presents CrowdScape, a system that supports the 
human evaluation of complex crowdwork through 
interactive visualization and mixed initiative machine 
learning 
Gould et al. 
(2016) 
Tests an intervention that encourages workers to stay 
focused on the job provider’s task after multitasking 















Examines how to make crowdwork accessible to 
crowdworkers with disabilities 




Examines the benefits of profiling crowdworkers; 





Presents a model to explain the impacts of benefit and 
cost factors as well as trust on solver participation 
behavior in crowdsourcing 
Deng and 
Joshi (2016) 
Explores the characteristics of crowdworkers, 
crowdsourcing jobs, and the crowdwork environment 
that collectively drives the crowdworkers to 
participate in open source work 
Durward et 
al. (2016) 
Investigates ethical issues in crowdwork (e.g., 
privacy, accessibility) and the impact of ethical issues 
on the sustainability of crowdwork for the worker 
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Considers the collective rights of independent digital 
contractors 




Presents a model of workers supplying labor to paid 
crowdsourcing projects; estimates a worker’s 
reservation wage (i.e., the smallest wage a worker is 
willing to accept for a task)  




Investigates factors that inflate reputation; also, 
proposes that aggregate private feedback scores from 
job providers to workers can be used by job providers 
to screen workers and make hiring decisions 
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Kittur et al. (2013) - + + + - - 
  
Hata et al. (2017) + - + - - + 
  
Deng et al. (2016) - + - + + - 
  
Brawley and Pury (2016) - + - + - - 
  
Rzeszotarski and Kittur 
(2012) 
- - + - - + 
  
Gould et al. (2016) - - + - - + 
  
Gupta et al. (2014) - - - + - + 
  
Horton and Chilton (2010) - + - - - - 
  
Deng and Joshi (2016) - + - - - - 
  
Chen and Horton (2016) + - - - - - 
  
Ipeirotis (2010) - - + - - - 
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Horton and Golden (2015) - + - + - - 
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Durward et al. (2016) - + - - - 
Al-Ani and Stumpp (2016) 
 
- + - + - 
Rzeszotarski and Kittur (2012) - - + + - 
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Tables A2 & A3 
Tables A1, A2 & A3 
Ryu and Lease (2011) Tables A1 & A2 
Jianhan et al. (2016) 
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